hunt-rce

> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY**

> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.

> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.

> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.

> **Mandatory confirmation gate**

> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:

> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.

> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.

> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.

> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.

>

> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.

Autonomous Testing Priority

**Content-type is the #1 silent failure mode for command injection.**

Traditional web forms use `Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded`. If you send a JSON body (`{"host":"127.0.0.1;id"}`) to a form endpoint, the server reads `request.form['host']` and gets nothing — the app executes normally with no injection, returning a plausible 200 response. You get a false negative with no indication anything went wrong.

**Rule:** If the page has an HTML form (`<form method="POST">`), use form-encoding. If the path is `/api/...` or the response is JSON, use JSON.

**Command injection operators to try (in order of prevalence):**

value;id        ← Unix semicolon (most common)
value|id        ← pipe
value&&id       ← AND
value$(id)      ← subshell
value`id`       ← backtick

**Proof:** OS command output (`uid=N(username) gid=...`) in the response body confirms code execution. The output may be HTML-wrapped — that still counts. If the response is otherwise normal (200, expected content) with the command output appended or embedded, exploitation is confirmed.

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Crown Jewel Targets

RCE vulnerabilities command the highest payouts in bug bounty programs because they grant attackers direct execution control over target infrastructure. The highest-value targets are:

**Highest-paying asset types:**

- **Enterprise server products** (GitHub Enterprise Server, self-hosted GitLab) — privilege escalation chains from low-privileged console roles to root SSH access consistently pay critical/high

- **Supply chain / package registries** — dependency confusion attacks against npm, PyPI, etc. hit critical severity across every major program

- **Cloud-native infrastructure** — exposed Kubernetes API servers, ingress controllers, and misconfiqured CI/CD pipelines

- **Mobile app backends and OAuth flows** — where server-side processing of attacker-controlled data meets execution contexts

- **Admin/management consoles** — template injection in configuration panels reaches root with a single payload

**Why this class pays most:**

- Blast radius is infrastructure-wide, not user-scoped

- Proof-of-concept is unambiguous — shell output is undeniable

- Fix requires architectural changes, not just a patch

- Programs cannot afford false negatives on RCE

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Attack Surface Signals

URL Patterns

/management-console/*
/admin/settings/*
/api/v*/exec
/api/v*/run
/webhook/*
/_internal/*
/import?url=
/render?template=
/preview?format=

Response Headers / Tech Stack Signals

X-Powered-By: Express          # Node.js — npm dependency surface
X-Powered-By: Phusion Passenger
Server: nginx (ingress-nginx)  # Kubernetes ingress — path field injection
X-Runtime: Ruby                # Rails ActiveStorage, RDoc, REXML attack surface
Content-Type: application/yaml # YAML parsers (SnakeYAML, Psych) — deserialization
X-GitHub-Enterprise-Version    # GHAS — nomad template, collectd, syslog-ng injection

JavaScript / Frontend Signals

// Look for these patterns in JS bundles
fetch('/api/exec', {method:'POST', body: cmd})
eval(userInput) <!-- securi